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Abstract
Suddenly and unexpectedly, after several decades as Asia’s 
backwater and basket case of international development, 
Myanmar was thrust to the center stage of international 
attention in 2011. The country’s political opening has paved 
the way for greater engagement by international players, old 
and new. South Korea and the United States are no exception, 
with Korea doubling its development assistance, trade, and 
investment in the country in less than five years. Myanmar serves 
as an excellent vantage point to observe Korea’s evolving role in 
international affairs, especially in terms of its Asian engagement. 
Pragmatism drives the relationship, with Nay Pyi Taw trying to 
diversify its foreign policy and attract more investment, while 
Seoul seeks to expand foreign economic relations, extend the 
domestic market, and secure access to new resources. The 
paper’s main contention is that while striving to articulate 
a distinctive regional and global role for itself which goes 
beyond the usual ‘aid-trade-investment’ triad, turning economic 
relationships into political ones has proven difficult, and thus, 
Seoul remains more of a ‘payer’ than a ‘player.’ Economic 
cooperation with Myanmar has widened and deepened, but 
South Korea’s political leadership has not been able to build on 
this momentum. Tackling this issue is important at a time when 
Korea needs to remind the new U.S. administration, which sees 
Seoul primarily through the prism of the North Korean nuclear 
issue and the tensions with China, of its strategic relevance. 
Myanmar offers South Korea the opportunity to enhance 
its international role beyond the immediate neighborhood. 
Key Words: South Korea’s engagements in Asia; Myanmar; U.S.-China 
rivalry and impact on Korea and Myanmar; inter-Asian connections
Introduction
Since 2009 five bilateral summits have taken place between 
South Korea and Myanmar. Twelve high-level political exchanges 
and fourteen economic exchanges were held between 2012 and 
2015. This is a far cry from the nadir of October 9, 1983 when 
a North Korean assassination attempt against South Korean 
President Chun Doo-hwan on an official visit to Yangon killed 
twenty-one people, including four senior South Korean officials 
and Korea’s Ambassador to the country. Though tragic, the event 
was consequential in a way that ran counter to Pyongyang’s 
intended objectives: Myanmar (then Burma) severed its 
diplomatic ties with North Korea. In turn, Myanmar’s economic 
and political relations with Seoul improved before suffering 
setbacks in the aftermath of the 1988 crackdown, the military 
takeover, and the imposition of international sanctions. South 
Korean development assistance, trade, and investment began 
to rise towards the end of the 2000s—doubling between 2009 
and 2014. Myanmar’s political liberalization, started in 2011, has 
given further impetus to the economic relationship. Yet, all this 
progress notwithstanding, Korea has not articulated a strategic 
vision as to why it should be in Myanmar or even Southeast Asia.
This paper’s aim is two-fold: first, to place the South Korea-
Myanmar bilateral relationship in the context of Seoul’s recent 
broader Asian engagement and of Myanmar’s diversification of 
its foreign policy ties. In this regard, an analysis of Korea-Myanmar 
relations is relevant to a number of debates concerning Korea’s 
foreign policy, its rationale, strategies, and impact. The second 
aim is to draw from this relationship implications for ROK-China 
and ROK-U.S. ties. Seoul needs to tread carefully as it strives 
to retain close economic relations with the former and crucial 
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security ties with the latter. Borrowing a terminology largely 
used to discuss the disconnect between grand aspirations and a 
less grand reality of EU foreign policy,1  this paper asks whether 
Korea has evolved from a more confined (even regionally) role 
of a provider, typically understood in the form of a development 
actor—a donor—and ‘rule-taker’ to a much more active role, 
potentially that of a ‘rule-maker.’ In the Korean case, this is 
often understood under the ‘middle power’ concept, which 
denotes a country’s aspiration, driven by its enhanced capability 
(e.g. economic prowess, in this case) to influence global affairs, 
and—not least—a recognition of its status by other powers.2 
Essentially this paper seeks to answer the following question: is 
Korea a global economic ‘player’ or ‘payer?’
To anticipate the thrust of the argument, the paper puts forward 
the following propositions: One, the economic relationship 
largely overshadows the political one to the point that, while 
Korea’s contribution is beyond dispute, the larger and more long-
term aims it pursues in the country remain underdeveloped, 
with a clear risk that its ‘spending’ (or paying) may not constitute 
the best use of its resources. Two, the paper highlights the 
difficulty of turning an emerging economic partnership into a 
political one, as evidenced by the decreasing attention dedicated 
to Southeast Asia in Korea’s foreign policy. In sum, there is 
considerable unfulfilled potential in an increasingly crowded field 
where the number of actors seeking to profit from Myanmar’s 
opening is expanding steadily. The paper draws on the author’s 
regular research visits to Myanmar since 2013 (most recently in 
November 2016) and various interviews conducted in Korea in 
recent years (the latest of which in January 2017). 
The text below is structured in five sections. In the next, the key 
features and challenges of Myanmar’s transition is summarized, 
primarily focusing on its foreign policy implications. The third 
section takes stock of the growing Korean economic presence 
in the country. This case study is then placed in a discussion of 
the diversification of Korea’s foreign policy and growing inter-
Asian connections. The impact of the relationship on U.S.-Korea 
relations and the deepening U.S.-China rivalry follows.
Myanmar’s Transition and Its Foreign Policy Implications
Myanmar’s military leadership surprised many observers when 
in 2011 it announced it was formally handing over power to a 
civilian government. Skepticism remained as most of the cabinet 
post-holders—such as former president Thein Sein himself—
included former generals. What followed was one of the most 
unexpected political transitions in recent times. After a by-election 
held in 2012 was won by the opposition, the National League 
for Democracy (NLD), expectations rose before the November 
2015 parliamentary elections and March 2016 presidential 
elections.3  What followed were the first free and fully-contested 
parliamentary elections since 1960. The NLD, founded and led 
by long-time opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 
Aung San Suu Kyi—daughter of the country’s ‘founding father’, 
General Aung San, and also known as Daw Suu—won a landslide 
victory. What was surprising was not so much the victory itself 
but rather its magnitude, clearly aided by the first-past-the-post 
electoral system. The government and the military accepted the 
results. In March 2016 presidential elections led to the election 
of the first civilian to hold the post in more than fifty years, Htin 
Kyaw, an NLD member and close aide of Daw Suu. Although she 
would have in all likelihood been elected easily, Aung San Suu Kyi 
was barred from running by a clause ad personam of the 2008 
constitution (article 59f). What followed was the formation of 
the government, which comprised mostly of NLD members and 
some technocrats. Daw Suu took on the post of foreign minister, 
the minister of the president’s office, and a newly-created 
position of state counsellor, which makes her virtually the prime 
minister and the head of the executive. 
It is difficult to underestimate the extent of such changes, and 
the speed at which these have occurred. At the same time, 
the transition is far from over and Myanmar can hardly be 
considered a liberal democracy today,4 with the military still 
holding a constitutionally protected veto power. In addition, the 
government might be new, but the challenges it is confronted 
with are predominantly old. Myanmar’s state-building process 
is widely seen as incomplete as the country has been plagued 
with ethnic insurgencies, predominantly around its mountainous 
periphery. As such, peace-building remains an utmost priority for 
the government. The one main new challenge is that of a forced 
cohabitation between the NLD government and the military. A 
thorny issue which marked the entire post-independence life 
of the country and has resurfaced with violence in the early 
2010s is a tide of (occasionally violent) nationalism spanning 
both majority and minority groups.5 The rekindling of conflict 
in Rakhine State and the overall lack of progress in the peace-
building process—despite the hype about the Panglong21 
Conference in August-September 2016—are stark reminders 
that much remains to be done. 
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The Diversification of Myanmar’s Foreign Policy
Much has been said about the extent to which the junta’s 
awareness that Myanmar had become, at the turn of the century, 
both an international pariah and politically and economically 
over-reliant on China’s support. Such considerations played a 
major role on the generals’ decision to open the system. The 
breakthrough has brought greater engagement from western 
powers—former President Obama visited the country twice—as 
well as Asian ones. Japan has boosted its presence,6  Singapore 
deepened economies ties, and Thailand and India remain 
important commercial partners. While all this has surely been 
important, the tendency in many western circles has been to 
overblow such considerations and speculate that this would also 
signal a move away from a close partnership with China. 
What the post-2011 transition has meant, as Chow and Easley 
convincingly show,7 is a diversification—or rebalancing—of 
Myanmar’s foreign policy, with an eye on enhancing partnerships 
(which never stopped even under sanctions as ties with Japan and 
Singapore show) and attracting investment and boosting trade, 
as well as much-needed development assistance. It is in this light 
that Korea’s outreach to Myanmar should be understood. While 
Korea’s economic clout is clearly visible even during a short 
cursory visit to the country’s commercial capital, Yangon, it is not 
going to replace China any time soon.
Expanding South Korea’s Presence in Myanmar
South Korea established diplomatic relations with Burma (the 
official country name at the time) in 1975, although for another 
few years Burma-ROK ties remained in the shadow of the junta’s 
closer relationship with the DPRK. The landmark events for vast 
improvements in the ROK-Myanmar relationship are the 1983 
bombing, which led to a downgrade in the relationship with 
Pyongyang, and the 2011 political opening, which allowed for 
greater engagement by the ROK. 
Myanmar’s appeal lies in its cheaper labor costs—with a labor 
force of 36 million and a GDP per capita at PPP of $5,500 as of 
2015—and a sizeable untapped market over around 51 million 
people (according to the 2014 census). The country’s natural 
resource wealth, with on- and off-shore oil and gas fields and 
huge mineral resources, also makes it immediately attractive 
to Korea’s resource-intensive economy. At the same time, a 
cumbersome legal framework in terms of economic policies, a 
labor force which may be large but also in need of substantive 
training, widespread corruption at all levels, and decrepit 
infrastructure make for a challenging environment.
Development Assistance
South Korea’s development assistance to Myanmar is relatively 
small when compared to that of other East Asian countries. 
Between 2001 and 2013 Korea’s overseas development 
assistance to Myanmar totaled around $92 million (Figure 1).8 
Disbursement to Korea more than doubled between 2010 and 
2013 and experienced a spike in 2014 (4.3 percent of KOICA’s 
budget) before declining somewhat in 2015 (around three 
percent). KOICA’s involvement in the country is wide-ranging, 
including support ($20 million) of the Myanmar Development 
Institute in Nay Pyi Taw, to higher education projects with the 
University of Yangon, as well as a $22 million-worth attempt 
to export the New Village Movement (Saemaul Undong) to 
the Southeast Asian country.9  Myanmar has moved up in the 
priority list for aid recipient countries, from being outside the 
top 20 in 2011 to number four in 2014 (and dropped to six in 
2015.) This is of course remarkable, but what is also different 
now compared to the start of the decade is that the aid sector 
is a truly crowded field with various Western and Asian actors 
all seeking to establish a presence in the country, only to realize 
that Myanmar does not have the capacity to manage projects or 
even spend funds.10
Trade
South Korea-Myanmar trade relations were established in 1967, 
but only grew significantly towards the late 2000s. Myanmar-
Korea trade experienced a three-fold increase since 2010 and 
exceeded $850 million in 2015 (Figure 2). Trade is undoubtedly 
Source: KOICA
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Figure 1. KOICA's ODA to Myanmar (2000-2015)
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growing, though this remains small compared to each country’s 
respective other trade partners (Table 1), a situation which is 
unlikely to change any time soon.
Adding comparative data places Korea-Myanmar in perspective. 
Korea’s trade with Myanmar only exceeds two ASEAN countries—
Laos and Cambodia.11  At the same time it has been increasing 
since 2010 (Figure 2), with a sharp increase in 2012 (mostly 
driven by exports to Myanmar) and a couple of slumps in 2013 
and 2015, though overall trade remains higher than 2011 levels. 
Korea is the sixth largest exporter to Myanmar. At the same 
time, trade between Myanmar and its other trade partners is 
considerably higher, as shown in Table 1. In 2014 Myanmar’s 
main import partners were China (42 percent), Thailand (20 
percent), and Singapore (10 percent). Korea, at 3.8 percent is 
clearly far behind. Myanmar’s main export destinations are 
China (32 percent), Thailand (31 percent) and India (9.2 percent), 
with Korea again a distant ninth at 4.9 percent, although this was 
a remarkable improvement from 2010 (2.6 percent).
Investment
Korea is among Myanmar’s top ten investors, with Myanmar being 
Korea’s fourth largest investment market in ASEAN. South Korean 
investment in Myanmar first dates back to 1990 when Daewoo 
Electronics opened a plant.13 Samsung and Hyundai sought to 
operate there in the 1990s as well but left due to the difficult 
business environment and the junta’s economic policies.14  Today, 
a large number of Korean companies are present—41 overseas 
enterprises as per Korea EximBank data—from Lotte to Daewoo 
International to restaurants, retailers, and others. Although a 
cursory visit to Yangon would impress ‘Korean business being 
everywhere,’ there are perhaps cautionary notes, such as the 
failure of the $1.4 billion Hanthawaddy International Airport 
project due to open in 2022 north of Yangon. The deal collapsed 
in 2014 as a result of disagreements between the government 
and the Korean company that won the tender (Incheon 
International Airport Corporation) over the capacity of the new 
airport (in terms of passengers). The project was eventually re-
assigned to the joint runner-up in the bid—Singapore’s Yongnam 
Changi International Airport and Japan’s JGC.15 
Table 1. Myanmar's Imports-Exports (2014/15, in US$ million
Rank Exports to Country Amount Rank Import from Country Amount
1 China 4,225 1 China 4,537
2 Thailand 3,193 2 Singapore 3,720
3 India 533 3 Thailand 1,494
4 Singapore 461 4 Japan 1,602
5 Japan 455 5 Malaysia 703
6 South Korea 328 6 South Korea 422
Total 10,420 Total 15,109
Source: Adapted from Park (2015, p. 659, table 17.7), original data from the Central Statistical Organization of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar.
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19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
Source: Korea Customs Agency
(http://www.customs.go.kr/kcshome/trade/TradeCountryView.do?layoutMenu
No=21031&year=2016&nation=Myanmar&nationCd=MM12
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
5An Appraisal of South Korea's Role in Myanmar
Of course, Korean FDI has been hardly unique (though it began 
flowing into the country somewhat ahead of western actors, 
where FDI accelerated when some of the sanctions lifted in 
2014). Of this about a third has been invested in the hydrocarbon 
sector (ca. $19.8 billion). Key investors in the country are 
Singapore ($4.3 billion) and China ($3.3 billion). In this respect, 
despite the smaller amount involved, Korea’s presence is far 
from negligible (Figure 4).
As the data in Figure 4 shows, the economic relationship has 
strengthened significantly in recent years. Korea’s economic 
presence in the country is wide-ranging and Seoul has emerged 
as an important economic partner for Nay Pyi Taw. As such, 
there is no doubt that, to use former President Lee Myung-
Bak’s expression in reference to Korea’s evolution from an aid-
recipient country to a donor and member of the OECD DAC 
(Development Assistance Committee) club, Korea is “giving back 
to the international community.”16  Yet, compared to other 
East Asian powers, South Korea’s overall presence in Myanmar 
remains smaller. There is no point denying the strategic aim of 
Korea’s growing economic presence and aid is unclear.17  As it 
continues to grow, it is important to ask how a broadening of 
foreign economic relations relates to other components of the 
country’s foreign policy. Why is Korea in Myanmar and what is it 
trying to achieve there?
An Actor in Search of a Script?
"The geopolitical context which emerged from the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, combined with 
Korea’s growing economic prowess, enabled greater dynamism 
and diversification in Seoul’s foreign policy-making."18 What most 
scholars note is the growing activism that has accompanied 
Korea’s foreign policy in recent decades. The end of the Cold 
War was in this respect a catalyst for change. Responding to 
this changing economic geography, the Korean government 
has tried to strengthen its economic ties with China, ASEAN, 
and new regions, especially with Southeast and Central Asia, to 
secure more energy resources and broaden its own production and 
investment networks. Within this strand of the scholarly literature 
Source: Directorate of Investment and Company Administration of the Republic of the 
Union of Myanmar, available at http://www.dica.gov.mm/sites/dica.gov.mm/files/
document-files/fdi_yearly_approved_amount_by_country.pdf (accessed 1 February 2017)
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can be found debates on how Korea positions itself in Asia.19 
Engagement in Asia (beyond Northeast Asia, that is) is crucial 
to understand Korea’s new role, its new ambitions and the 
outward projection of its domestic economic prowess.20  
In South Korea’s semi-presidential system, presidents have 
a strong say in setting a foreign policy agenda.21 This has led 
to a plethora of presidential strategies or initiatives, often 
overlapping in geographical or substantive focus, but so explicitly 
aimed at replacing the predecessor that this ultimately hindered 
continuity in foreign policy-making. The presidencies of Kim Dae-
Jung, Roh Moo-Hyun, and Lee Myung-Bak and their attitudes 
towards Korea’s broader role in Asia are a case in point. Although 
he was surely better known for his opposition to authoritarian 
rule and, later, the policy of engagement towards North Korea, 
President Kim Dae-Jung also sought to expand Korean ties with 
Southeast Asia. For him, Korea was as much a Northeast as a 
Southeast Asian country, thereby articulating a strategic vision 
for a Korea “beyond the Korean peninsula.”22  President Roh Moo-
hyun continued along these lines, although his push appeared 
to be more towards Central Asia, with his “Comprehensive 
Central Asia Initiative.” President Lee Myung-bak expanded the 
ties to Central Asia but embedded them in a broader ‘New Asia 
Initiative.’ Therein partnerships with ASEAN countries features 
prominently. Under his presidency, Korea’s foreign policy grew 
more ambitious and assertive and resource diplomacy became 
one of its defining elements. Overseas development assistance 
would generate the political will necessary to boost trade and 
investment.23 The "synergetic state-private approach enabled 
private-sector representatives to be deployed more extensively, 
supported by the public-sector trade representation that was 
the leading element of Korea’s diplomatic presence in these 
countries."24
Compared to her predecessors, President Park Geun-hye has 
paid less attention to Southeast Asia. Her Eurasia Initiative, 
as the name implies, was geared towards Northeast Asia and 
the development of trans-continental linkages connecting 
the Korean Peninsula to Russia and then Europe. The Eurasia 
Initiative called for linking energy and a logistic infrastructure 
(such as rail networks, oil and gas pipelines, and electricity grids) 
across Europe and Asia, with an emphasis on ‘co-developing 
China’s shale gas and eastern Siberia’s petroleum and gas.’25 
There was little space for Myanmar and Southeast Asia in all this, 
also because rhetoric aside, Korea remained preoccupied with 
its relations with China and the United States.26  The feeling was 
as if a significant opportunity was about to be lost. 
What this means is that the strongly partisan nature of Korean 
foreign policy-making prevents the formation of a consensus as 
to where the country’s long-term interests are. Reinventing the 
wheel every five years does not help Korea advance its political 
and economic interests. 
High political considerations aside, the Myanmar case highlights 
a second factor that has hindered the articulation of a strategic 
vision for Korea’s role in Asia (and beyond): limited partner 
expertise in Korea and a lack of government-academia-business 
conversation. During a recent visit to Seoul27  many interviewees 
in academia and think tanks noted both the limited capacity 
within government agencies to deal with Southeast Asia as a 
whole, let alone specific countries. To be clear, Southeast Asia 
is well covered in Korean universities and think tanks. Seoul 
National University and Sogang University are home to several 
scholars with expertise on the region, and their Centers for 
Southeast Asian Studies produce excellent research (though 
a greater number of publications in English would presumably 
broaden readership and thus potentially impact). The Korean 
Association of Southeast Asian Studies (KASEAS) and the Korean 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (KISEAS) serve the purpose 
of strengthening academic networks and the Korea-ASEAN 
Center in Seoul is an additional source of expertise and contacts. 
That said, Myanmar-specific expertise is far more limited and 
Busan University of Foreign Studies appears to be an exception 
in this regard, with a Department of Myanmar Studies within 
the College of Asian Studies. Korea’s leading think tanks host 
Myanmar-focused workshops but these tend to be one off 
events, rather than the result of larger systematic collective 
endeavors focused on the country.
Tackling these issues should proceed in reverse order and would 
require the South Korean government (and private foundations) 
to significantly expand expertise on Southeast Asia, facilitate 
greater dialogue between academia and the policy community 
as well as a more dynamic conversation between Korea- and 
Myanmar-based experts. Chung-Ang University’s KOICA-funded 
partnership with the University of Yangon, for example, built 
around capacity-building in the higher education sector, with 
frequent visits in both directions, is a step in this direction.
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Broader Implications
Clarifying the significance of ties with Myanmar and more broadly 
Southeast Asia is not only important for Korea’s strategy there, 
but also relates directly to its relationship with the United States. 
Normalizing relations with the country might have been one of 
the main foreign policy successes of the Obama administration, 
and surely the least controversial achievement, when compared 
to the breakthrough with Cuba and the Iran deal. It is safe to 
assume that a Trump administration might be less interested 
in Myanmar’s political transition, the various human rights 
issues plaguing that country, and its internal instability and 
underdevelopment. What does a Trump administration, from 
what is possible to evince from the campaign and post-campaign 
statements, mean for South Korea and what can Korean policy-
makers to do tackle this issue? Answering this question is 
especially timely since ‘headwinds’ clearly lie ahead for the U.S.-
Korea relationship.28  And, more importantly for this paper, how 
does Myanmar fit in such debates?
South Korea is unlikely to be a top priority for the Trump 
administration (if anything, North Korea might be, alongside 
China). So far, its presence in the campaign and transition 
debates was a function of two issues: the proximity of North 
Korea and the nuclear question, and the demand made by Donald 
Trump during the campaign that U.S. allies either contribute 
what they are supposed to or make a greater contribution 
to the relationship, specifically referencing Korea and Japan. 
Although there is considerable space to shape the debate and 
the orientation of the new administration in its early weeks and 
months, the vacuum in the Korean political leadership could 
not come at a worse time. South Korea will struggle to retain 
its strategic relevance, especially without its top leadership as 
‘Choi Sun-sil gate’29 is dragging down not only President Park 
but higher echelons of the political and economic establishment. 
As remotely located as Myanmar might be from both South Korea 
and the United States, its position as a resource-rich middle-sized 
country at China’s periphery—and one with a close yet bumpy 
relationship with its larger neighbor to the north—presents 
both Washington and Seoul with clear opportunities, if played 
well. The poor handling of minority issues and the plight of the 
Rohingya community are likely to be of little or no interest to 
either Korea or the United States. Instead, most likely Myanmar 
will be seen in Washington through the prism of U.S.-China 
relations. For this reason, in principle, the U.S. should retain an 
interest in this country, though it might be unwilling to dedicate 
many resources to it, financial or political. A China busier with, 
and occasionally challenged in, its immediate neighborhood 
(the South China sea and the Greater Mekong region) should 
theoretically be good news for the United States. This of course 
is predicated on a strong Myanmar-U.S. relationship first and 
the possibility that Myanmar might be keener on closer ties 
with Washington than Beijing. Daw Suu’s early moves, however, 
with a first trip to Beijing and the one to Washington, suggest 
the opposite. Beijing matters more to the success of Myanmar’s 
peace-building process than Washington as what the U.S. can 
offer in this regard is unclear at best.
Thus, assuming a U.S. interest in Southeast Asia but also a 
reluctance to stay directly engaged, Korea might play the role 
of the ‘surrogate’ as its presence would be less likely to rouse 
suspicions in Beijing. Korea has all the resources needed to 
anchor more firmly Myanmar’s transition—its own experience, 
a lack of political and historical baggage, and a willingness to 
trade and invest—that would make it a preferable partner to 
Myanmar than many other far-away western states. Myanmar’s 
government might not be in a position nor have the will to 
pursue closer military ties with Washington. Given the state of 
Myanmar’s armed forces and supplies and the need of training, 
the Tatmadaw would benefit from enhanced security cooperation 
with South Korea without directly involving Washington, which 
could tacitly approve the relationship. To be clear, this is not 
to say that Korea’s policy towards Myanmar will be directed by 
Washington or that Seoul has no agency. Quite the opposite, 
Korea can augment its strategic relevance by complementing 
what it has been doing so far with a deeper political and security 
relationship, which would help both Myanmar and, indirectly, 
the United States.
Conclusion
South Korea-Myanmar relations have grown tremendously since 
the start of the decade. Seoul’s relationship with Nay Pyi Taw is 
illustrative of broader trends in Korean foreign policy such as its 
greater activism, ambition, and diversification. At the same time, 
it also highlights the challenges of turning economic cooperation 
into a strong political relationship and therefore growing out of 
the role as ‘taker’ or ‘provider’ to one as ‘player,’ contributing 
to structuring economic and political relations, perhaps even 
beyond the limited confines of a bilateral relationship. Myanmar 
welcomed Korea’s growing interest as this allowed the country 
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to diversify foreign policy ties, expand political, economic and 
even socio-cultural networks, and attract foreign investment. 
Despite its greater contribution in terms of aid-trade-investment, 
Korea is not going to suddenly replace China as the single most 
important international partner of Myanmar; neither is Korea’s 
development assistance—though valuable—going to exceed 
Japan’s. Despite the obvious differences, both countries face the 
same strategic predicament in that, economically close to China 
and (especially in the Korean case) politically to Washington, 
they may be faced with a stark choice should U.S.-China relations 
deteriorate significantly. This is far from inevitable, and there 
are ways for Korea to carve its own niche to protect itself from 
a downturn. In recent years, Korea’s place in Southeast Asia 
has remained on the sidelines of policy-making and strategic 
thinking, and while Korea has made gains in absolute terms it has 
lost terrain to other East Asian competitors.
Seoul’s relationship with Myanmar raises legitimate doubts as to 
whether the flow of resources into Myanmar is part of a strategy 
aimed at deepening the relationship. There is nothing inevitable 
about a South Korean presence in Myanmar and abrupt changes 
in the global geopolitical landscape have clear reverberations 
even on this bilateral relationship. With presidential elections 
taking place in 2017, a new Korean administration will have the 
opportunity to reposition Korea’s role in Myanmar in a more 
strategic and reflexive manner. A late-comer to the region, Korea 
now risks missing the train to Nay Pyi Taw. The new South Korean 
leadership will face momentous changes and will have to make 
some urgent choices.
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